It’s not stupidity

The last few years have added considerably to the doctrine of attrition warfare, which was only broadly considered at the time of WWII and probably hardly thought of at the level of individual soldiers.

Today, any soldier that is not sub 85 IQ should have a much better understanding of the concept of attrition warfare, and thus be able to apply it even at squad or individual soldier level.

First a brief overview of the concept in historical context.

Attrition warfare is basically the process of exhausting the enemy’s resources at every level, materiel, food, vehicles, people, fuel, and even the home economy of the country or region opposing you.

The basic premise is simple: Make the perpetuating of war on you and yours so expensive in terms of all of the above that the enemy either retreats (sub-optimal result as they will likely regroup then try again, with better intelligence) or bankrupt them to the point that they are defeated or at least run away with such losses that the regrouping will be long, painful and unlikely, which also give you time to regroup, solidify gains and prepare.

Due to its nature, attrition warfare greatly favours the home team. Vietnam and Afghanistan are prime examples of how rice farmers and goat herders, armed with far inferior weapons and technology and no air power to speak of, nevertheless eventually beat off the most powerful military in the world like mangy dogs.

Iraq, Syria and Iran will do the same regarding the current and somewhat ongoing troubles in the Middle East since the early 1990s.

The IRA in Ireland finally wore down the English government too. In short, history is filled with examples of what essentially amounts to attrition warfare. It really only requires one thing, which is a cultural aspect primarily, and that is, the morale or culture to never give up and always, always, always, continue the warfare by every means against the occupying force. Attrition warfare is not really an option when you are the “away team” as America and the whole of NATO has clearly shown us in the last two years, as they have exhausted their weapons, their willpower (if there was ever any) their logistics and damaged the economies of the entire NATO/USA Globohomo industrial complex.

These are the broad brushstrokes, but let us now focus on the much higher resolution aspects when these are considered from the individual or small team level of operations, which essentially means guerrilla warfare, or basically local resistance movements in an occupied country or region.

The negatives for the “rebels” are obvious to all. No economy of scale, lower quality weaponry, no access to high-tech offensive and defensive capabilities like military drones, armoured vehicles, tanks, helicopters and so on. The likelihood of higher or even total annihilation if a force-on-force battle is engaged in and so on.

However, there are many advantages that when made use of, over a long period of time eventually result in victory, in no particular order, these are:

• Knowledge of local conditions and terrain
• Intelligence from locals and friendly disposition towards the rebels by the locals of the same ethnicity, religion and so on, which can provide also ongoing material support (food, water, hide-outs and so on)
• Understanding local customs and culture (assuming the invader is foreign). If the invader is the country’s own military, this will be much reduced but still somewhat applicable (EG the Basques in Spain, the IRA in Ireland, and so on.)
• the ability to cause extensive damage to the enemy for little to no cost, some examples:
  • A single round through an aircraft cockpit grounds it and uses up mechanics, and support staff and renders the designated pilot useless.
  • The death of a leader, pilot, or key person will cause comparatively wide-spread disruption when compared to the death of a “rebel” since these are at most “organised” as loosely connected small “cells”. Even the destruction of an entire “cell” of rebels generally leaves the remaining cells undisturbed.
  • Literally any individual can be a potential threat to the enemy, from the 4’10” female barista at the local tavern to the 6’2″ veteran who willingly stays hidden in a hide for 3 days under a monetised foil blanket to avoid being seen by drones, just so he can place that shot at a valuable enemy target from 1000 yards away.
  • Even if not actively militant, the local populace can provide intelligence just as a result of their daily tasks and routines.
  • Disruption of important logistics can result in additional widespread chaos among the enemy troops and a corresponding lowering of morale.
  • Attacks of opportunity against the invaders are rife and will require extra security measures with corresponding drop in morale for the enemy and increase in hatred for them by the locals. A serviceman that goes to the bathroom in a local restaurant might get stabbed by another patron who follows him into the toilets before leaving quietly seconds later.
  • Disruption of local services can be easily accomplished and easily reinstated for the locals if required.
  • Civilians can infiltrate the enemy encampment, home country, and so on, and then pass on intelligence, or attack infrastructure and/or personnel deep behind enemy lines, with again, corresponding drop in morale.

Regardless of the overall size and power of a foreign military, if the home team has endless staying power, as the Muslim Afghani or Quasi-buddhist Vietnamese, or Catholic Irish have, eventually, they will overcome and be victorious.

You can see therefore, the deep importance of religions that go back thousands of years and that have been tested over millennia with regards to loyalty, faith and timeless reliability.